Abstract The "memory" literature emphasizes the notion of encoding variability, whereas the "word recognition and attention" literature typically asserts that it is impossible to prevent immediate lexical and semantic activation when single words are presented to skilled readers. In the four experiments reported here, the presence/absence of a Stroop effect was associated with the nature of the between-trial context. These data can be understood as an expression of contextually driven encoding variability, but are problematic for the decontextualized "automatic" processing account that has prevailed in the attention and performance literature for the last six decades.
Introduction
Words are among the most common stimuli in cognitive psychology. Given this, one might have expected to see, across areas, a certain similarity of theoretical perspective as regards to how such stimuli are processed. This is not the case at present. Despite the fact that words are common stimuli in many studies of memory, and necessary stimuli in studies of word recognition and attention, there is a continuum of thought across these areas in terms of the degree to which stimulus coding is seen as flexible (controlled) or inflexible (automatic).
The notion of "levels of processing" has strongly influenced the mainstream memory literature since the early seventies (e.g., Challis & Brodbeck, 1992; Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Lockhart & Craik, 1990) . In this framework participants were seen as engaging in different "levels" (elaboration) of processing of the stimulus that were determined by the orienting tasks they were given. Stimulus encoding was seen as highly flexible (see also Tulving's encoding specificity principle in which encoding and retrieval are heavily context dependent). The idea that participants inevitably engaged in lexical/semantic analyses of a word was not generally entertained in the context of this literature.
In contrast, a very different view continues to dominate the word recognition and attention literature. Here, the presentation of a word (even if masked such that participants deny any phenomenal experience of it) is claimed to trigger immediate lexical-semantic processing; this process cannot be prevented (e.g., Marcel, 1983; Neely, 1977; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Stroop, 1935 ; see also reviews by MacLeod, 1991; Neely, 1991; and Neely & Kahan, 1999) . Standard discussions of the semantic priming and Stroop paradigms illustrate this thinking very clearly. In the semantic priming paradigm participants view a prime, and then a target. A major claim is that participants cannot prevent themselves from processing the prime to the semantic level. The typical result is that subsequent target processing is facilitated:
"One of the strongest pieces of evidence supporting an Automatic Spreading Activation account of priming is the subliminal priming effect. " Neely, 1991, p. 297 "Additional evidence that strongly supports the concept of Automatic Spreading Activation comes from certain aspects of Favreau and Segalowitz's (1983) and Neely's (1977) results and the relatedness proportion effect. These results show that at short SOAs for which ASA effects should be maximal, a prime facilitates the processing of a related target to the same degree regardless of whether participants have been instructed to expect unrelated or related targets to follow the prime and independent of the probability that the target following a prime will be related to it. This confirms that activation spreads between related nodes independent of any strategies participants may be using. " Neely, 1991, p. 298 "The research reported herein conclusively demonstrates that automatic semantic [similarity] priming exists." McRae and Boisvert, 1998, p. 567 Similarly, in the Stroop paradigm the participant is typically presented with a word that is printed in a colour that is either congruent with the word's meaning (RED in red; GREEN in green) or incongruent (RED in green; GREEN in Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1999, 53:4, 374-380 red) and participants are asked to identify the colour and ignore the word. The standard result is that the congruent condition is faster than the incongruent condition, and it is typically argued that participants are unable to prevent themselves from reading the word: "A fail-safe demonstration of automaticity, in particular the automatic nature of accessing word meaning, involves the Stroop task." Ashcraft, 1994, p. 72 "the automatization of word recognition allows much quicker reading....but also leaves us vulnerable to the Stroop effect...knowing about this effect is no protection-the processes are not open to control." Reisberg, 1997, p. 603 "...there is good evidence that skilled readers obligatorily process printed stimuli when it (sic) is presented to the fovea, even if they intend to ignore it, and even if interferes with a competing task (Stroop, 1935) . Thus, we argue that the presentation of a word triggers an obligatory but capacity demanding operation that results in lexical access and the generation of phonological and semantic codes." Paap and Herdman, 1998, p. 847 The Present Investigation The purpose of the present paper is twofold. The first is to draw attention to the contrast discussed above, namely, the idea that words can be encoded in a variety of ways versus the idea that words are processed "automatically" in the sense that they are always immediately processed to the lexical/semantic level. We use the term "immediately" in deliberate fashion, because we mean only to assert that processing associated with an oven response on the current trial is not affected (or is only minimally so) by the irrelevant word. We do not mean to imply that a word never gets processed (e.g., at some point after an overt response) in any paradigm. Indeed, given that both Kalian et al. (1996) and Boutilier and Besner (1997) report negative priming following the presentation of a single Stroop word with a single coloured letter on a prime trial, such a view must be false. Relatedly, an interesting (though still unexplained) difference is between the effects of identifying a single coloured letter in a prime display versus letter search through a prime display. The former does not prevent semantic priming to a following target in lexical decision (McNevin & Besner, 1999) , but the latter does (e.g., Chiappe et al., 1996; Smith et al., 1983; Stolz & Besner, 1996 .
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We address here that claim about automatic processing which holds it to be inevitable, ballistic, and triggered by the stimulus. We have nothing to say here about the intentionality criterion for automatic processing, other than to claim that it is part and parcel of the (unconscious) default set.
3
To be sure, we do not claim that all kinds of encoding variablity have paradigm (broadly defined) where the standard result is typically interpreted in terms of the automaticity assumption as defined here, and suggest that the standard memory perspective (encoding variability) offers a more powerful conceptual framework within which to understand the Stroop effect.
In that vein, Besner and Stolz (1999a) reported several experiments in which a neutral word was presented at fixation, and a colour word (appearing in white) appeared above or below the neutral word. The neutral word was coloured, and participants were asked to identify the colour and ignore all the words in the display. When all the letters in the word at fixation were coloured, congruent trials were faster than incongruent trials, the standard result in the Stroop literature. However, when only one letter in the word at fixation was coloured, there was no significant difference between congruent and incongruent conditions.
Besner and Stolz argued that these results are inconsistent with the received view that, in the context of Stroop-type tasks, words are inevitably (automatically) processed to the lexical/semantic level (relatedly, see Bauer & Besner, 1997; Besner & Stolz, 1999b; Besner, Stolz, & Boutilier, 1997) . They suggest instead that the default set is to process words to the semantic level, but that this set can be overridden by the context. It was further argued that the processing algorithm applied to the stimulus at fixation was also applied to the irrelevant colour word outside fixation, provided that the material at, and outside, fixation belonged to the same domain (in this case, a linguistic domain). On this account, colouring only a single letter in a word at fixation induced a set that promotes processing that either does not engage the lexical/semantic level, or is simply nonlinguistic. Since this set is also applied to the processing of the colour word appearing outside of fixation, the Stroop effect can be eliminated (at least to the point where it is difficult to reject the null hypothesis).
NEW EXPERIMENTS
The same general paradigm is employed in the experiments reported here, the intent being to both buttress and extend the previous findings reported by Besner and Stolz (1999a) . The central theme here consists of two related claims. The first, already noted, is that the processing algorithm applied to the material at fixation is also applied to the material outside fixation (the rationale being that it is difficult to hold two different mental sets concurrently when they are in the same domain). 4 been denied in the word recognition and attention literature (e.g., see Pexman and Lupker, this volume; see also Paap & Noel, 1991, Experiment 2; Stone 8c Van Orden, 1993 , among others.
The exception to this is when one set is conscious, and the other unconscious. In our view, this is what accounts for the striking results
The second claim is that the nature of the material that appears at fixation on some trials influences the algorithm applied to material that appears at fixation on other trials (relatedly, see Smith, Besner, & Miyoshi, 1994; Stolz & Besner, 1996 , 1997 , for examples of context effects in the semantic priming paradigm). The primary manipulation here consists of a coloured target (a single coloured letter) that is embedded in a nonlinguistic array, or appears in isolation. In the former case, the nonlinguistic context is meant to induce participants to treat the colour carrier (the letter) as a nonlinguistic object. In the latter case, the presentation of the letter on its own is meant to encourage it being treated as a linguistic object. These manipulations are factorially combined, across experiments, with whether the remaining trials consist of a word in which all the letters are coloured, or a word where only one letter is coloured.
Briefly, in Experiment 1, a single coloured letter in a word appeared at fixation on half the trials (as in Besner & Stolz, 1999a) and the other trials consisted of a single coloured letter embedded in a background of nonalphabetic characters from the top of the keyboard. Neither fixation condition produced a Stroop effect. This null finding replicates the critical observation in Besner and Stolz (1999a) , and extends it in a way that few readers would likely find surprising.
In Experiment 2, only a single letter in a neutral word at fixation was coloured on half the trials; this condition was thus identical to one of the conditions in Experiment 1. The remaining trials, however, consisted of only a single coloured letter appearing in one of the five positions at fixation, in an attempt to induce linguistic processing for a coloured letter in both contexts. Both fixation conditions now produced a Stroop effect. The between-trial context was thus able to override the context effects seen in Experiment 1, and in Besner and Stolz (1999a) .
All trials in Experiment 3 consisted of material at fixation that was always entirely coloured. Half the trials consisted of a neutral word; the other trials consisted of a single letter, as in one of the conditions in Experiment 2. As most observers would expect, both conditions produced a Stroop effect.
Experiment 4 combined elements of Experiment 3 with elements of Experiment 1. Half the trials consisted of a neutral word at fixation in which all the letters were coloured. The remaining trials consisted of a single coloured letter embedded in a string of nonalphabetic characters from the top of the keyboard. The central question here concerns how the between-trial context will affect performance, if at all. Will the word context dominate, the nonalphabetic context dominate, or will the current trial context override reported by Neely (1977) , rather than processing being "automatic." "Unconscious" need not imply "automatic" (e.g., see the discussion in Besner & Stolz, 1999a,b) . the between-trial context? The outcome of this experiment is inconsistent with the received "automatic processing" account, but is easy to accommodate in the present framework.
GENERAL METHOD
Participants. University of Waterloo psychology undergraduates were paid to participate. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and reported themselves to be native English speakers. No participant took part in more than one of the following experiments. Twenty undergraduates participated in Experiment 1, 26 in Experiment 2, 16 in Experiment 3, and 36 in Experiment 4.
Design. All four experiments used a 2 (type of stimulus at fixation) x 2 (distractor colour-word congruency: congruent vs. incongruent) within-participants design.
Stimulus materials and test list construction. All four experiments consisted of 144 trials in which the participant was asked to respond to the colour of a stimulus presented at fixation. In all experiments the stimulus at fixation was presented inside a bounding box. Distractor colour words were always presented either 3 mm above or 3 mm below the side of the bounding box. The distractor words used were the words "red" (9 mm long x 5 mm high), "blue" (12 mm long x 5 mm high), "green" (15 mm long x 4 mm high), and "yellow" (18 mm long x 6 mm high). The words were presented in Micro Experimental Lab (MEL, Schneider, 1988) romantri.fnt font, which is a graphical version of the standard MEL font. All colour words were always presented in white (RGB: 63,63, 63). On half of the trials the distractor word was congruent with the colour displayed at fixation. The distractor word was incongruent with the colour displayed at fixation on the remaining trials. Each fixation condition in the experiment was associated with an equal number of congruent and incongruent distractor words.
The stimulus at fixation varied systematically across experiments. In all experiments, 72 five-letter, colour-neutral words were used as stimuli on half the trials. One of these words was presented inside a 56 x 25 pixel bounding box at fixation; only one letter was coloured in Experiments 1 and 2, and its position was randomly determined. In Experiments 3 and 4 all the letters in these words were coloured. Each of these words appeared only once in the experiment. On the other half of the trials the stimulus at fixation in Experiments 1 and 4 consisted of four nonalphabetic characters [#, &,@,%] that appeared in white, and were randomly assigned to positions 1-5. The remaining slot was filled with a coloured letter chosen at random from the alphabet. In Experiments 2 and 3 the other half of the trials consisted of a single coloured letter that was randomly assigned to positions 1 through 5; no other material at fixation was present on these trials. The stimulus conditions at fixation in all four experiments are illustrated in Table 1 ; the two fixation conditions in any experiment consist of a combination of one of the column and one of the row displays. The colours used on the stimuli at fixation were red (RGB: 42,0,0), blue (RGB: 0,0, 42), green (RGB: 0,42,0), and yellow (RGB: 63, 63, 21). In the part-stimulus coloured condition, the "noncoloured" stimulus parts were presented in MEL white (RGB: 63, 63, 63).
All experiments consisted of 144 experimental trials; nine in each of the 16 trial types formed by crossing the "portion of stimulus coloured" factor and the congruency factor with the four ink colours. There were an equal number of congruent and incongruent trials in each experiment. All conditions were randomly intermixed in each experiment, and each participant received a different random order of trials. A set of 48 practice trials was also constructed to meet the experimental trial constraints. Administration of the practice trials preceded the experiment proper.
Procedure. Participants were tested individually, seated approximately 45 cm from a computer monitor. Task instructions were displayed on the monitor and were also relayed verbally by the experimenter. Stimuli were displayed on a Microscan 4V/AD1 colour monitor controlled by MEL software implemented in a Vault Pentium 100 computer.
Each trial began with the appearance of a centrally located white fixation box. Following a 500-ms SOA, the coloured (whole or part) stimulus was presented in the fixation box simultaneous with the presentation of the distractor word above or below the fixation box. The distractor word appeared above the box on half the trials and below the box on the other half. Distractor word location was distributed equally across all conditions.
Participants were instructed to ignore the distractor word and to respond to the ink colour of the stimulus at fixation. Responses were made with the left and right hands by depressing a key covered with an appropriately coloured piece of paper. The coloured paper covered the "z", "x", " > ", and "/" keys and were red, blue, yellow, and green, respectively. A response terminated the stimulus display and initiated a 500-ms inter-trial interval during which time the screen remained blank. The MEL software recorded reaction time to the nearest ms and response accuracy. Participants were given the opportunity to ask questions following the practice phase and were instructed to perform the task as quickly and as accurately as possible.
RESULTS
Only RT data from correct responses were entered into the analyses. A 2 x 2 within-participants ANOVA was performed on both the RT and the error data from each experiment. Before the analyses were conducted, the RT data were participanted to a recursive trimming procedure in which the criterion cutoff for outlier removal is established independently for each participant, in each condition, by reference to the sample size in that condition (Van Selst & Jolicoeur, 1994) . This trimming procedure resulted in 2.2% of the correct RT data being discarded in Experiment 1,2.7% in Experiment 2, 2.0% in Experiment 3, and 2.1% in Experiment 4. The trimmed means and percent error data for each condition in each experiment are displayed in Table 1 .
Experiment 1 yielded no significant main effects, and no interaction (fs < 1). Nothing in the error data was significant either.
Experiment 2 produced a significant main effect of Congruency,/(I, 25) -16.65, MSE -1,458.9,p < .0004, a significant main effect of Level (word vs letter),
(1,25) = 14.8,AfS£= 1,538.1, p < .0007, and no interaction (F < 1). There were no significant effects in the error data. Experiment 3 yielded a significant main effect of Congruency, /(1,15) = 4.77, MSE = 1,963.6, p < .05, no main effect of Level, and no interaction (f"s < 1). There were no significant effects in the error data.
Experiment 4 failed to produce an effect of Congruency, f(l,35) = .89, p > .3, MSE = 1,469. The main effect of Level was significant, f(l, 35) = 4.74, MSE = 1,018, p < .05. The interaction was not significant (f < 1). There were no significant effects in the error data.
Two statistical issues merit comment. The first is that taking the results of Experiments 1 and 4 at face value entails accepting the null hypothesis of no Congruency effect, an uncomfortable position to be in given the usual concerns about statistical power. One could point to the fact that Experiment 4 has more than twice the number of participants in Experiments 2 and 3 (each of which did produce a Congruency effect), but it would be preferable to have more convincing evidence. In an effort to increase power, we combined Experiments 1 and 4, treating them as one large experiment with a nonlinguistic background. Despite an increase in the number of participants (to 56), there was no evidence of a Congruency effect in the analysis (F < 1).
Nonetheless, we would not like to claim that the size of the Congruency effect in Experiments 1 and 4 is zero, given that a small effect is difficult to detect. For present purposes it is sufficient to claim that the Congruency effect in Experiments 2 and 3 is larger than the [nonsignificant] Congruency effect in Experiments 1 and 4. This claim was assessed by a cross-experiment ANOVA in which Experiments 2 and 3 were treated as a single experiment with a linguistic background, and Experiments 1 and 4 were treated as a single experiment with a nonlinguistic background. This analysis yielded the necessary Congruency x Experiments interaction, f(l, 96) •= 8.3, MSE = 1585.28,/> < .005.
DISCUSSION
The central findings of these four experiments can be summarized quite simply. When the stimulus at fixation on half the trials consists of only a single coloured letter, then both Experiments 2 and 3 produced a Stroop effect. In contrast, when a coloured letter was embedded in a string of nonalphabetic characters from the top of the keyboard on half the trials, then Experiments 1 and 4 failed to produce a significant Stroop effect. The results of Experiments 3 and 4 are particularly striking in this regard. The all-coloured word condition produced a Stroop effect in Experiment 3 (n = 16), yet this same condition produced no Stroop effect in Experiment 4 (n -36) when the other trials consisted of a single-coloured letter embedded in a string of nonalphabetic characters from the top of the keyboard. To put it another way, the standard way of presenting words did not always produce a Stroop effect in the context of the present paradigm. More defensibly, the Stroop effect that was observed in Experiments 2 and 3 was significantly larger than the nonsignificant Stroop effect observed in Experiments 1 and 4.
The most general conclusion is that the standard automaticity account that appears in hundreds of textbooks, chapters, and published papers in the experimental psychology literature is discomfited by these data.
5 This automaticity account assumes that the mere presentation of a word is sufficient to trigger lexical and semantic processing provided the stimulus is large enough, clear enough, bright enough, and presented for long enough where it can be seen. This account makes no provisions for the observation that the kind of processing a stimulus receives is determined by the context; in essence, a word is a word is a word.
If the standard automaticity account cannot explain these results then how should they be explained? Our working hypothesis is that lexical-semantic processing typically (but not necessarily) reflects the action of the default set which participants (unconsciously) hold. However, the algorithm applied to the processing of the stimulus at fixation may also be applied to the processing of the irrelevant colour word, provided that the two stimuli belong to the same domain (i.e., linguistic). Thus, if the processing at fixation is not carried through to the semantic level then a similarly leveled analysis will typically be applied to the irrelevant word outside fixation (see also Besner & Stolz, 1999a) . The results reported here suggest that this hypothesis needs extending in at least one major way. The processing algorithm applied to the stimulus at fixation can vary as a function of stimulus characteristics on the current trial, but can also be affected by the kind of processing elicited by stimuli on other trials. In the present instance, biasing participants to encode letters as linguistic/nonlinguistic objects via the context had profound effects that were experiment wide.
A CAVEAT The main difficulty associated with the "set" idea advanced here and elsewhere is that it is underspecified. There is as yet nothing in the framework which specifies when the between-trial context will dominate, and when it will not. For example, when trials in which all the letters are coloured in a word are mixed together with trials in which only a single letter in a word is coloured, the former context only dominates itself in that there is a Stroop effect for the all-coloured word, but no significant Stroop effect in the single coloured letter in a word condition (Besner & Stolz, 5 There ire a number of demonstrations that semantic priming can be prevented by having participants search the prime display for the presence/absence of a single letter (e.g., Chiappe, Smith & Besner, 1996; Henik et al., 1994; Smith et al., 1983; Stolz & Besner, 1996 . This result also undermines the claim that semantic processing is "automatic" in the sense that it cannot be prevented (but see Neely and Kahan, 1999 for their objections). 1999a, Experiments 1 & 2). It remains to be seen whether this "set" notion is so powerful [circular] as to be unfalsifiable, or whether it can be developed so as to make principled predictions. 6 Whatever the outcome, we should not lose sight of the main contribution of the present experiments, which is that context has a powerful impact on processing, contrary to the standard "automaticity" account.
Conclusions
Our general claim is that processing words to the lexicalsemantic level, although typically unintentional, is the default set rather than automatic in the sense of being inevitable, as widely claimed. This default set can be overridden in a number of ways (e.g., see Bauer & Besner, 1997; Besner et al., 1997; Besner & Stolz, 1999a,b; Stolz & Besner, 1996 , 1997 ; other types of demonstration have been reported (e.g., Whittlesea & Brooks, 1988) , and new ones will undoubtedly emerge.
RESERVATIONS?
How might a die-hard proponent of "automatic" lexicalsemantic processing respond to the present findings? One line of argument is that there is a distinction between automatic activation of lexical-semantic representations, and whether that information is used during the computation of a response. Activation might still be "automatic," but for reasons still to be articulated, that information may not necessarily influence an overt response. It seems unlikely that purely behavioural experiments will be able to rebutt this kind of argument easily. It remains to be seen whether a more micro level analysis (e.g., fMRI, ERP, or MEG coupled with behavioural measures) will provide evidence of covert lexical-semantic processing prior to the point in time at which an overt response is made that is unaffected by these factors.
LAST WORDS
Seeing the big picture depends on the right frame: Context is (almost) everything.
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Sommaire
La documentation de «memoire» souligne la notion de la variabilite du codage, tandis que la documentation consacree «a la reconnaissance des mots et a Pattention» affirme typiquement qu'il est impossible de prevenir une activation lexicale et semantique immediate quand des mots individuels sont presented a des lecteurs competents. Dans les quatre experiences decrites ici, la presence ou 1'absence d'un effet Stroop a etre associee a la nature du contexte entre les epreuves. Ces donnees peuvent etre considerees comme une expression de la variabilite du codage axee sur le contexte, mais posent des problemes pour le releve de traitement «automatique» a contexte suppnme qui a prevalu dans la documentation axee sur 1'attention et le rendement, au cours des six dernieres decennies.
